Suspicious Cloudflare Tunnel Masquerading as conhost.exe During Medusa Operations (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-29
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a binary named conhost.exe running Cloudflare tunnel arguments, a masquerade Storm-1175 uses by renaming the cloudflared client to conhost.exe to establish covert command and control during Medusa ransomware operations. Legitimate conhost.exe never runs tunnel parameters, so this combination surfaces a disguised tunneling channel used for remote access and exfiltration.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.