Suspicious Cloudflared Tunnel Execution via Renamed svchost Binary

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process named svchost.exe running Cloudflare tunnel arguments from outside the System32 directory, matching the renamed cloudflared tunnel used by the RMMProject operators for covert C2 access. Adversaries rename cloudflared to svchost.exe to blend in while establishing an outbound tunnel. A svchost image running tunnel arguments from a non-system path is anomalous and indicates masqueraded tunneling.

Related detections9 linkedT1572 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs
Suspicious SSH Reverse Tunnel Over DNS Port
Suspicious Reverse SSH Tunnel Exposing Local SSH via process_creation
Suspicious OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel Creation via Process Creation
Suspicious OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel Establishment via process_creation
Suspicious LocalToNet Tunneling Tool Execution
Malicious RDP Tunneling via ngrok (via process_creation)
Suspicious UUID Named Pipe Created Consistent with Mythic SMB Agent
Malicious Chisel Reverse Tunnel Execution for Protocol Tunneling
Suspicious Cloudflared Tunnel Execution via Renamed svchost Binary
Pivot detection · T1572 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.