Suspicious CLR Runtime Load into Non-DotNet Process via Injection

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-02
Updated
2026-11-02

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the .NET common language runtime being loaded into processes that do not normally execute managed code such as Windows Explorer as described in the WithSecure lab where a C3 relay injected a Covenant Grunt into a host process. A CLR image loaded into a non managed host is a well known indicator of in memory .NET tradecraft and process injection used to run tooling stealthily.

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Suspicious CLR Runtime Load into Non-DotNet Process via Injection
Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.