Suspicious Command and Control via Discord or Telegram Bot API

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-14
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2 → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects processes connecting to Discord webhook or Telegram bot API endpoints, a command and control and exfiltration channel used by the Tomiris APT. The actors tunneled tasking and stolen data through Discord webhooks and Telegram bot APIs to hide inside allowed messaging traffic. Non-browser processes contacting these bot endpoints strongly suggest abuse of trusted web services for C2.

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Suspicious Command and Control via Discord or Telegram Bot API
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.