Suspicious Container Environment Discovery via Proc Cgroup

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects reads of the init process cgroup entry combined with Docker socket probing, the container-awareness discovery JADEPUFFER performs before deciding how to spread and extort. The actor inspects cgroup membership to determine whether it runs inside a container. This reconnaissance precedes container escape and ransomware deployment.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.