Suspicious Credential Added to Existing Application for OAuth Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-01
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID audit events that add certificates or secrets to an existing application registration, the technique SolarWinds actors used to inject their own credentials into trusted OAuth apps for durable cloud access. New credentials on established applications can let an attacker authenticate as that service principal, so these changes should be reviewed as potential persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious IAM Policy Attachment Granting AdministratorAccess
Suspicious Credential Added to Application or Service Principal in Entra ID (via azure)
Okta System Log: New Identity Provider Created via system.idp.lifecycle.create
Suspicious Credential Added to Existing Application for OAuth Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)
Pivot detection · T1098.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.