Suspicious Credential Store Access for WinSCP and PuTTY via PowerShell (via ps_script)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
ps_script
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-16
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell script content referencing WinSCP and PuTTY session registry stores or the Windows Credential Manager enumeration API, the credential theft behavior of the SEO poisoning infostealer. These paths and calls harvest saved SSH, SFTP and enterprise credentials. Scripts touching these secrets stores are a strong credential access indicator.

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Suspicious Credential Store Access for WinSCP and PuTTY via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Pivot detection · T1555 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.