Suspicious D-Bus System Service Persistence File Creation

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543Create or Modify System Process
Priv Esc
- T1543Create or Modify System Process
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects writing of a D-Bus system service definition under the dbus-1 system-services directory, a persistence technique from the Elastic Linux persistence grand finale. A malicious service file causes D-Bus to launch attacker code on demand with elevated privileges. New service definitions created through shell tooling rather than package managers warrant review.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious D-Bus System Service Persistence File Creation

Pivot detection · T1543 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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