Suspicious D-Bus System Service Persistence File Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-18
Updated
2026-09-18

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects writing of a D-Bus system service definition under the dbus-1 system-services directory, a persistence technique from the Elastic Linux persistence grand finale. A malicious service file causes D-Bus to launch attacker code on demand with elevated privileges. New service definitions created through shell tooling rather than package managers warrant review.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.