Suspicious Data Exfiltration via WinSCP Command Line in BlackSuit Ransomware

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-03
Updated
2026-10-03

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects WinSCP driven from the command line with an embedded session and scripted transfer commands, an exfiltration behavior used by BlackSuit ransomware operators. Attackers script WinSCP to push stolen data to attacker-controlled SFTP servers before encryption, so scripted WinSCP sessions on servers are a strong exfiltration signal.

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Suspicious Data Exfiltration via WinSCP Command Line in BlackSuit Ransomware
Pivot detection · T1048 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.