Suspicious Decoy Copy and Rename of PDF to Executable (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-06
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a malicious LNK using xcopy or ren to copy a decoy PDF and rename it into an executable or DLL as part of a Cobalt Strike delivery chain distributed via GitHub and Quora dead-drops. Disguising a payload as a document and flipping the extension at runtime lets the attacker present a benign lure while planting the real loader on disk.

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Suspicious Decoy Copy and Rename of PDF to Executable (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.