Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a delegated permission grant that targets an Entra agent blueprint access_agent scope, the consent step that lets an attacker-controlled app drive an assistive AI agent. Adversaries obtain delegated access to agents that can send mail and act on the user behalf, so a grant referencing access_agent indicates agent hijacking through illicit consent.

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Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
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Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.