Suspicious Dell DBUtilDrv2 Vulnerable Driver Load via driver_load

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of the Dell DBUtilDrv2.sys driver which is a known vulnerable driver abused in bring your own vulnerable driver attacks. ToddyCat installed DBUtilDrv2.sys through a crafted INF to disable kernel notification routines and blind security products. The presence of this signed but vulnerable driver on non Dell maintenance systems is a strong indicator of kernel level tampering.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Dell DBUtilDrv2 Vulnerable Driver Load via driver_load

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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