Suspicious Dell DBUtilDrv2 Vulnerable Driver Load via driver_load

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
driver_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-06
Updated
2026-10-06

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of the Dell DBUtilDrv2.sys driver which is a known vulnerable driver abused in bring your own vulnerable driver attacks. ToddyCat installed DBUtilDrv2.sys through a crafted INF to disable kernel notification routines and blind security products. The presence of this signed but vulnerable driver on non Dell maintenance systems is a strong indicator of kernel level tampering.

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Suspicious Dell DBUtilDrv2 Vulnerable Driver Load via driver_load
Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.