Suspicious Device Code Authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-27
Updated
2026-09-27

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects device code authentication requests targeting the Microsoft Authentication Broker application, identified by its client identifier 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e, which attackers abuse to obtain a Primary Refresh Token during device code phishing. A stolen PRT provides broad, durable access to the victim tenant. This combination is a high-confidence indicator of an OAuth device code phishing attack.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent or Permission Grant (via auditlogs)
Malicious Context.ai OAuth Application Authorization by Client ID (via google_workspace)
Suspicious Entra ID ROPC Authentication Bypassing MFA
Suspicious Consent to Application Grant in Entra ID
Malicious Azure AD Application Consent Granted with Mail Permissions
Suspicious Device Code Authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker
Suspicious Microsoft 365 OAuth Authorization to Visual Studio Code Client
Suspicious Microsoft Entra Device Code Authentication Flow
Suspicious Google Workspace OAuth Authorization for Chrome Web Store Scope via Token Audit
Suspicious Device Code Authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.