Suspicious Device Registration Following OAuth Token Theft

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID device registration and Primary Refresh Token acquisition activity consistent with the ROADtools tradecraft used after OAuth phishing. Registering an attacker-controlled device lets the adversary obtain a PRT and maintain durable access to the tenant beyond the stolen refresh token.

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious browsercore Execution from Anomalous Parent for PRT Cookie (via process_creation)
Suspicious AWS SSO Account Role Enumeration via ListAccountRoles (via cloudtrail)
Suspicious AWS Federated Console Login From Programmatic Credentials
Suspicious Workday Payment Election Change via Compromised Account (via workday)
Suspicious M365 Legacy Authentication via BAV2ROPC Client via m365
Suspicious Entra Agent Service Principal Sign-In With PowerShell User Agent via Sign-In Logs
Suspicious Entra ID Auth Broker Sign-In With Node.js User Agent via Tycoon 2FA
Possible Check Point SmartConsole Token Redemption Endpoint Access (via proxy)
Suspicious Device Registration Following OAuth Token Theft
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.