Suspicious Device Registration Following OAuth Token Theft

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1098.005Device Registration
Priv Esc
- T1098.005Device Registration
Defense Evasion
- T1550.001Application Access Token
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1550.001Application Access Token
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID device registration and Primary Refresh Token acquisition activity consistent with the ROADtools tradecraft used after OAuth phishing. Registering an attacker-controlled device lets the adversary obtain a PRT and maintain durable access to the tenant beyond the stolen refresh token.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Federated Identity Credential On-Behalf-Of Token Flow via Sign-In Logs

Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent

Possible Rogue Device Registration in Entra ID (via azure)

Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)

Suspicious Entra Sign-In With Axios Automation User-Agent via AiTM Token Replay (via azure)

Suspicious Azure Tenant Root Elevation via elevateAccess

Malicious Azure AD Token Abuse via Roadtx

Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365

Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD

Suspicious Device Registration Following OAuth Token Theft

Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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