Suspicious dirty_sock Local Account Artifact From Snapd Privilege Escalation (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-31
Updated
2026-10-31

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command lines referencing the dirty_sock account name created by the Dirty Sock snapd privilege escalation exploit. The public proof of concept abuses the snapd /v2/create-user API to add a local user able to escalate via sudo. Detecting the default dirty_sock artifact flags exploitation of the snapd local privilege escalation vulnerability.

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Suspicious dirty_sock Local Account Artifact From Snapd Privilege Escalation (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.