Suspicious Disabling of WinRM Service via sc config

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-22
Updated
2026-09-22

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the sc command setting the WinRM service start type to disabled, an impair-defenses step observed in the Prometei intrusion. Disabling WinRM reduces remote management and logging capabilities that defenders rely on during response. While admins occasionally disable WinRM, doing so alongside other malware activity is a meaningful defense-evasion signal.

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious SELinux Enforcement Disabled via setenforce on Ivanti Appliance
Suspicious Firewall Port Opening via Netsh
Malicious ETW Disabling via COMPlus_ETWEnabled Environment Variable
Suspicious CrazyHunter BYOVD Driver Drop in Public Directory
Suspicious Execution of cfmon.exe Masquerading as ctfmon via CharmingCypress
Suspicious SELinux Enforcement Disabled via Setenforce Command Line (via process_creation)
Suspicious Disabling of WinRM Service via sc config
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.