Suspicious DLL Execution via rundll32 from PerfLogs Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-28
Updated
2026-09-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32 loading a DLL from the C:\PerfLogs directory, observed in the Netscaler intrusion where the actor ran ch.dll,Start from PerfLogs. PerfLogs is not a normal location for executable DLLs, so rundll32 invocation against it strongly indicates proxied malicious code execution.

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Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.