Suspicious DLL Hijack via BugSplatRc64 Sideloading (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-06
Updated
2026-10-06

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of BugSplatRc64.dll from a signed loader named nau.exe used to sideload a Cobalt Strike beacon in the GitHub and social-media delivery campaign. The attacker abuses the search-order of a legitimate application to run their DLL under a trusted process name. Pairing the loader name with the hijacked module distinguishes this from benign crash-reporting usage.

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Suspicious DLL Hijack via BugSplatRc64 Sideloading (via image_load)
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.