Suspicious DLL Load from WPS INetCache Temp Directory via Image Load

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-23
Updated
2026-09-23

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a DLL being loaded from the %localappdata%\Temp\wps\INetCache path, where the WPS Office exploit chain plants an attacker DLL named by MD5 hash for side-loading. Legitimate DLLs are not resolved from this cache directory. This indicates DLL search-order hijacking used by the APT-C-60 downloader.

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Suspicious DLL Load from WPS INetCache Temp Directory via Image Load
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.