Suspicious DNS Exfiltration to azurestaticprovider Backdoor Domain

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-14
Updated
2026-09-14

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries carrying the structured bt.node.js label suffix to the azurestaticprovider backdoor domain used by the trojanized node-ipc package. The backdoor encodes stolen developer credentials into subdomains resolved through the actor name server for covert exfiltration. DNS lookups matching this domain or the encoded node.js suffix indicate active credential theft over DNS.

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Suspicious DNS Exfiltration to azurestaticprovider Backdoor Domain
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.