Suspicious DNS-over-HTTPS C2 via Wildcard DNS Services

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-10
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS resolution of sslip.io and nip.io wildcard DNS domains that encode an IP address in the hostname, matching BRICKSTORM DNS-over-HTTPS command-and-control on appliances and hypervisors. Espionage operators use these services to dynamically map beacon traffic to attacker infrastructure while blending with legitimate DNS.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.004 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs
Suspicious UPSTYLE Command Channel Pattern in Web Requests via CVE-2024-3400
Suspicious DNS C2 to Microsoft Typosquat Domain
Suspicious DNS Queries to Simitor Tracking Tunnel Infrastructure
Suspicious DNS Queries to Secshow Open Resolver Scanning Infrastructure
Suspicious OpenMetadata Exploit Interactsh OAST Callback (via process_creation)
Suspicious Outlook Process Spawning Network Utilities for NotDoor C2 (via process_creation)
Malicious DNS Query To fdmpkg C2 Domain via DNS Query
Malicious SUNBURST avsvmcloud.com C2 DNS Query
Suspicious DNS-over-HTTPS C2 via Wildcard DNS Services
Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.