Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries to dynamic DNS and tunneling provider domains frequently abused by commodity remote access trojans such as XWorm AsyncRAT DCRat and njRAT for command and control. These providers let adversaries map attacker infrastructure to disposable hostnames and tunnel traffic past network controls. Detecting lookups to these domains surfaces potential RAT beaconing that warrants investigation.

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Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs
Pivot detection · T1572 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.