Suspicious Domain Admins Group Membership Addition via Net (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-24
Updated
2026-09-24

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of net.exe to add an account to the Domain Admins group, a privilege-escalation and persistence action taken during Operation Jacana. Granting Domain Admins membership hands an attacker full control of the Active Directory environment.

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Account Added to Domain Admins via net localgroup
Suspicious Azure Key Vault Access Policy Modification
Malicious Cluster-Admin Role Binding Creation (via audit)
Malicious User Password Change Using Current Hash Password - ChangeNTLM - Mimikatz (via security)
Suspicious Account Password Set to Never Expire. (via security)
Malicious Modification of a Computer Account SPN (via security)
Suspicious Massive Group Membership Changes (via security)
Malicious High Risk Active Directory Group Membership Change (via security)
Malicious Account Marked as Sensitive and Cannot Be Delegated Had Its Protection Removed (via security)
Suspicious Domain Admins Group Membership Addition via Net (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.