Suspicious Double Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Shell in CI (reviewdog Supply Chain)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a base64 decoded payload being piped directly into a shell, the execution pattern of the injected reviewdog/action-setup install.sh that dumped CI runner memory. It matters because decode into shell in a build step is a common way supply chain payloads execute credential theft code without touching disk.

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Suspicious Access to Cloud and Database Credential Files via Process
Suspicious Credential Exfiltration to webhook.site (via dns_query)
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Suspicious Double Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Shell in CI (reviewdog Supply Chain)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.