Suspicious Double Extension PDF Executable via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-25
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of a file using a .pdf.exe double extension. The Lumma stealer is distributed with this masquerading trick so the payload appears to be a document while it is in fact an executable, tricking users into launching the stealer.

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Windows Suspicious Double-Extension Execution via Parent Command Line
Windows File Creation: Suspicious LNK Double-Extension Targeted by Document/Image Prefixes
Windows File Events: Flag Files With Double Extensions (e.g., .docx.exe)
Suspicious Double Extension PDF Executable via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1036.007 · 7 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.