Suspicious EDRKillShifter Vulnerable Driver Load from User Temp Directory (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a kernel driver being loaded from a user profile temporary directory, matching the behavior of the EDRKillShifter loader which drops a vulnerable BYOVD driver with a randomized name into AppData Local Temp and starts it to disable security tooling. Loading a signed but vulnerable driver from a user writable temp path is highly unusual for legitimate software.

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Suspicious Dell DBUtilDrv2 Vulnerable Driver Load via driver_load
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Malicious Vulnerable Driver Load by GentleKiller BYOVD EDR Killer
Malicious Known Vulnerable Driver Load for BYOVD Attack
Malicious Qilin EDR Killer BYOVD Driver Load
Suspicious Masqueraded Zemana Driver Written to Disk via updatedrv (via file_event)
Suspicious EDRKillShifter Vulnerable Driver Load from User Temp Directory (via image_load)
Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.