Suspicious Entra Agent Service Principal Sign-In With PowerShell User Agent via Sign-In Logs

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a service principal sign-in using a PowerShell user agent against Entra Agent ID identities, a pattern of automated credential misuse where an attacker authenticates as an AI agent through scripted Graph calls. Because assigned agents normally authenticate through their own runtime rather than interactive PowerShell tooling, this user agent on service principal sign-ins indicates hands-on-keyboard abuse of agent credentials.

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Federated Identity Credential On-Behalf-Of Token Flow via Sign-In Logs
Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent
Suspicious Entra Sign-In With Axios Automation User-Agent via AiTM Token Replay (via azure)
Malicious Azure AD Token Abuse via Roadtx
Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Suspicious Google Workspace OAuthLogin From Node.js Client via Tycoon 2FA
Malicious GCP Service Account Backdoor via serviceAccountTokenCreator Grant
Suspicious GCP Service Account Impersonation via GenerateAccessToken
Suspicious Entra Agent Service Principal Sign-In With PowerShell User Agent via Sign-In Logs
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.