Suspicious Entra Cross-Tenant Access or External User Invitation via Azure Audit (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-19
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID operations that add cross-tenant partners, invite external users, or create access packages, overlooked entry points into Microsoft Azure that adversaries abuse for persistence per Red Canary. These identity changes can silently grant outside principals durable access to a tenant, so unexpected occurrences should be validated against approved administrative activity.

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Suspicious GCP Service Account Impersonation via GenerateAccessToken
Malicious Azure Elevate Access to User Access Administrator
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Suspicious Entra Cross-Tenant Access or External User Invitation via Azure Audit (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.