Suspicious Entra ID Device Registration and Windows Hello Credential Persistence

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID audit events for registering a device or adding a Windows Hello for Business credential which attackers chain after token compromise to obtain a Primary Refresh Token and provision phishing-resistant persistent access to the tenant. When these events follow anomalous sign-ins they indicate an attacker establishing durable account persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.005 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
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Suspicious AWS Virtual MFA Device Creation
Suspicious Device Registration Following OAuth Token Theft
Suspicious Workday Payment Election Change via Compromised Account (via workday)
Possible Rogue Device Registration in Entra ID After Device Code Phishing
Suspicious Exchange Online Mail Flow Rule or Connector Creation via Compromised Account
Suspicious Entra ID Device Registration and Windows Hello Credential Persistence
Pivot detection · T1098.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.