Suspicious Entra ROPC Password Spray Against Azure CLI Client

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-27
Updated
2026-09-27

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID sign-ins using the Resource Owner Password Credential flow against the Azure CLI application, matching the LSHIY password spray campaign. The ROPC flow submits usernames and passwords directly and cannot satisfy interactive MFA, making it a favored channel for spraying against tenants with conditional access gaps. Repeated ROPC attempts against Azure CLI indicate automated credential guessing.

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Suspicious Entra ROPC Password Spray Against Azure CLI Client
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.