Suspicious Entra Sign-In Interrupt With High Aggregated Risk via AiTM DNS Hijacking (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule surfaces Microsoft Entra sign-ins carrying a high aggregated risk score alongside interrupt or success result codes, the pattern seen when SOHO router DNS hijacking redirects victims through an adversary-in-the-middle proxy that replays authentication. Adversaries use the hijacked DNS to intercept credentials and tokens, so high-risk sign-ins clustered with these result codes warrant investigation for token theft and mailbox access.

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Suspicious Entra Sign-In Interrupt With High Aggregated Risk via AiTM DNS Hijacking (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.