Suspicious Error 524 Decoy Smishing Phishing Endpoint Access (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-22
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects access to the single-page phishing endpoints used by the Error 524 decoy smishing campaign, including getApp application-id lookups and WebSocket uuid exfiltration paths. The campaign hides credential and card data theft behind fake Cloudflare Error 524 pages. Detecting these URIs reveals victims interacting with the phishing infrastructure.

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Suspicious Error 524 Decoy Smishing Phishing Endpoint Access (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.