Suspicious Execution from Hidden Diagnostic Directory via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-15
Updated
2026-09-15

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of binaries from a hidden directory named .end or of the Diagnostic.exe and Windows.Diagnostic.Document.EXE loaders used in the MuddyWater eN-Able chain launched from an LNK attachment. Adversaries hide payloads in dot-prefixed folders and use benign-looking diagnostic filenames to evade casual inspection while a decoy window distracts the user.

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Suspicious Execution from Hidden Diagnostic Directory via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1204.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.