Suspicious Execution from Reserved Device Name Directory by Miner Campaign

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1564.001Hidden Files and Directories
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects process execution from directories using reserved DOS device names such as NUL and AUX under ProgramData, a hiding technique the miner campaign uses to place payloads in paths that standard tools cannot easily access or delete. Execution from these reserved-name folders is a strong indicator of deliberate concealment.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Execution from Reserved Device Name Directory by Miner Campaign

Pivot detection · T1564.001 · 9 related

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