Suspicious Execution from Reserved Device Name Directory by Miner Campaign

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-07
Updated
2026-10-07

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects process execution from directories using reserved DOS device names such as NUL and AUX under ProgramData, a hiding technique the miner campaign uses to place payloads in paths that standard tools cannot easily access or delete. Execution from these reserved-name folders is a strong indicator of deliberate concealment.

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Suspicious Execution from Reserved Device Name Directory by Miner Campaign
Pivot detection · T1564.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.