Suspicious Execution of Dotnet Injection Target Utilities

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-09
Updated
2026-09-09

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of InstallUtil, AddInProcess32, or CasPol outside of a development context, the signed dotnet utilities abused as injection hosts by the PureHVNC loader from the fake Kling AI site. The loader hollows these trusted binaries to run its RAT payload. Detecting unexpected launches exposes process injection into living off the land binaries.

Related detections9 linkedT1055.012 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious RegSvcs Execution Spawned by Script Interpreter for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by PowerShell via PhantomVAI Loader (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading Non-DLL Image Extension File
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Command Shell for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Malicious Desktop Window Manager Impersonation From Non-System Path via process_creation
Suspicious .NET Utility Spawned by AutoHotkey Loader for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious csc.exe Spawned by Document Reader for Process Injection
Suspicious RegAsm Execution Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious .NET Utility Launched as Process Injection Target (via process_creation)
Suspicious Execution of Dotnet Injection Target Utilities
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.