Suspicious Execution of Dotnet Injection Target Utilities

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-09
Updated
2026-09-09

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of InstallUtil, AddInProcess32, or CasPol outside of a development context, the signed dotnet utilities abused as injection hosts by the PureHVNC loader from the fake Kling AI site. The loader hollows these trusted binaries to run its RAT payload. Detecting unexpected launches exposes process injection into living off the land binaries.

Related detections9 linkedT1055.012 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious AppLaunch.exe Spawned As Injection Target (via process_creation)
Suspicious JScript.NET Compiler Spawned by AutoIt for Process Hollowing
Suspicious Code Execution via InstallUtil LOLBIN (via process_creation)
PureHVNC Process Hollowing into RegAsm Spawned by PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious RegSvcs Reflective .NET Load from Fake Update Chain
In-Memory XWorm Injection Target RegAsm Spawned from User AppData (via process_creation)
Suspicious Service Persistence via InstallUtil with Masqueraded Service Name
Possible Process Injection Target RegAsm Launched Without Arguments via Process Creation
Suspicious Execution of Dotnet Injection Target Utilities
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.