Suspicious Execution of freenode Linux Backdoor Helper Binary

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-05
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the helper binary used by the Linux backdoor from the freenode IRC network compromise. Observed in NCC Group research analyzing that Linux backdoor which deploys a helper at /bin/dh. Detecting this uncommon helper path helps surface rootkit-supported backdoor activity on Linux hosts.

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Suspicious Execution of freenode Linux Backdoor Helper Binary
Pivot detection · T1059.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.