Suspicious Execution of PIF File as AutoIt Loader

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-03
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of a process image with the .pif extension, an abuse observed in a Lumma infostealer campaign where a renamed AutoIt3 interpreter named Riding.pif performed process hollowing to inject the stealer. It captures the use of an uncommon executable extension to disguise a script interpreter. Detecting this is important because .pif files launching as active processes are almost never legitimate on modern systems and frequently indicate masqueraded loader activity.

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Suspicious Rundll32 Loading Non-DLL Image Extension File
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Command Shell for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Malicious Desktop Window Manager Impersonation From Non-System Path via process_creation
Suspicious .NET Utility Spawned by AutoHotkey Loader for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious csc.exe Spawned by Document Reader for Process Injection
Suspicious RegAsm Execution Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious .NET Utility Launched as Process Injection Target (via process_creation)
Suspicious Execution of PIF File as AutoIt Loader
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.