Suspicious Execution of PIF File as AutoIt Loader

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-03
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of a process image with the .pif extension, an abuse observed in a Lumma infostealer campaign where a renamed AutoIt3 interpreter named Riding.pif performed process hollowing to inject the stealer. It captures the use of an uncommon executable extension to disguise a script interpreter. Detecting this is important because .pif files launching as active processes are almost never legitimate on modern systems and frequently indicate masqueraded loader activity.

Related detections9 linkedT1055.012 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious AppLaunch.exe Spawned As Injection Target (via process_creation)
Suspicious JScript.NET Compiler Spawned by AutoIt for Process Hollowing
PureHVNC Process Hollowing into RegAsm Spawned by PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious RegSvcs Reflective .NET Load from Fake Update Chain
In-Memory XWorm Injection Target RegAsm Spawned from User AppData (via process_creation)
Possible Process Injection Target RegAsm Launched Without Arguments via Process Creation
In-Memory Regasm Process Hollowing Spawned by PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious AppLaunch.exe Execution as Process Hollowing Target
Suspicious Execution of PIF File as AutoIt Loader
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.