Suspicious Execution or Load from Fake System32 Directory Imprint (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-07
Updated
2026-10-07

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process image path that contains a fake system directory of the form \Imprint\Windows\system32. The examined privilege-escalation technique builds a counterfeit system drive directory such as C:\Imprint\Windows\system32 to trick trusted loaders into resolving files from an attacker-controlled path, so an image running from this structure indicates path-based deception during exploitation.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.