Suspicious extrac32 CAB Extraction Abuse

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-20
Updated
2026-10-20

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the extrac32 LOLBin extracting cabinet contents using the /Y overwrite and /E extract-all switches. In the observed ClickFix chain extrac32 is abused to unpack a staged payload such as Boat.pst. This living-off-the-land extraction step helps adversaries deploy secondary tooling while avoiding dedicated archive utilities.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.