Suspicious F5 Appliance Reconnaissance Commands

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.004Unix Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects post exploitation reconnaissance commands run on an F5 appliance such as enumerating configuration files and locating the VERSION file as described in NCC Group RIFT F5 TMUI intelligence. Adversaries execute these commands after TMUI exploitation to fingerprint the device and its configuration before deploying webshells so these sequences on an appliance are suspicious.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious F5 Appliance Reconnaissance Commands

Pivot detection · T1059.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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