Suspicious File Permission Grant to Everyone via Icacls (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1222.001Windows Permissions
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects icacls granting the Everyone principal full control of files or directories, a file-permission-modification step attackers use to make payloads world-writable or to weaken protected paths. Broad permission grants are tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting these commands surfaces tampering with access controls.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1222.001 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Computer Account Modifying Active Directory Permissions - PrivExchange (via security)

Suspicious Recursive icacls Grant of Full Access to Everyone via process_creation

Malicious Replication Privileges Granted to Perform DCSync Attack (via security)

Windows: fsutil SymlinkEvaluation behavior modification via command line

Windows Suspicious takeown.exe Recursive Ownership Change

Windows Process Creation: File/Folder Permission Changes via cacls/icacls/net attrib/takeown

Windows Security: Detect WRITE_DAC on AD DS objects (Event ID 4662)

Windows process activity matching WannaCry executables and ransom note text

Suspicious File Permission Grant to Everyone via Icacls (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1222.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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