Suspicious Font File Passed as Argument to Script Interpreter via Lua Loader (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the TTF Trap loader in which a WScript or CScript host launches a bundled Lua or AutoIt interpreter and passes a file with a .ttf extension as the script to execute. Legitimate font files are never executed as interpreter scripts. This masquerade of a loader script as a font is characteristic of the campaign.

Related detections9 linkedT1036.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious MicrosoftEdgeUpdate Launched with Dat Config File
Malicious Scheduled Task Masquerading as Defender NisSrv via Schtasks
Malicious PowerShell Masquerading as Windows Terminal in ProgramData (via process_creation)
Suspicious Csrss Process Masquerading Outside System32 (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mimilite Credential Dumper Execution Writing KB-Named Output
Suspicious PikaBot Autorun Persistence Pointing to AppData Microsoft Dropzone via registry_set
Malicious Live Ledger Persistence via Realter HD Audio Run Key via registry_set
Malicious Live Ledger Stealer Execution via Ledger Lives Masquerade via process_creation
Suspicious Svchost Masquerade Execution from Non-System Path
Suspicious Font File Passed as Argument to Script Interpreter via Lua Loader (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.