Suspicious FortiGate Rogue Admin with Unrestricted Trusthost (via fortigate)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
fortigate
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects FortiGate configuration events that create or modify an administrator account with a trusthost of 0.0.0.0/0, allowing management access from any source address. Threat actors used rogue admins such as support, ssl-admin, and helpdesk with wide-open trusthosts to keep access to compromised appliances. An admin with an unrestricted trusthost is a strong persistence and access indicator.

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Rogue Machine Account Creation via Powermad New-MachineAccount
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Malicious Switch User to Rogue Root-Equivalent Account troot (via process_creation)
Malicious Rogue F5 BIG-IP Administrator Account Creation via tmsh (via process_creation)
Suspicious Hidden Local Account Creation SqlDbAdmin via Process Creation
Suspicious FortiGate Rogue Admin with Unrestricted Trusthost (via fortigate)
Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.