Suspicious GCP Bucket Deletion for Namespace Hijacking (via gcp)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
gcp
Service
gcp.audit
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects GCP storage bucket deletion operations that enable universal bucket hijacking, where an attacker recreates a same-named bucket in another account to intercept data. This tactic redirects storage transfer, pubsub, and logging outputs to adversary-controlled resources.

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Suspicious EBS Snapshot Shared With External Account via CloudTrail
GitHub Audit Log: Repository or Organization Transfer Detected
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Suspicious GCP Bucket Deletion for Namespace Hijacking (via gcp)
Pivot detection · T1537 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.