Suspicious GCP Service Account Key Creation for Persistence (via gcp.audit)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
gcp
Service
gcp.audit
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the CreateServiceAccountKey method in GCP audit logs, the persistence technique Red Canary described where a service account creates a new key for itself to survive key-deletion remediation. Because these tokens are not revokable, key creation where the requesting principal matches the target service account is a strong sign of an actor establishing durable access.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.001 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Credential Added to an Azure AD Application (via auditlogs)
Suspicious AWS Long-Term Access Key Creation for Persistence via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious Credential Added to Existing Application for OAuth Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)
Suspicious IAM Policy Attachment Granting AdministratorAccess
Suspicious Credential Added to Application or Service Principal in Entra ID (via azure)
Okta System Log: New Identity Provider Created via system.idp.lifecycle.create
Suspicious GCP Service Account Key Creation for Persistence (via gcp.audit)
Pivot detection · T1098.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.