Suspicious Google API DNS Query From Temporary Directory Process Abused for C2

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
windows
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-02
Updated
2026-10-02

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries to Google Sheets or Drive API hosts originating from a process running out of a temporary or user AppData directory, a covert command-and-control channel described by Intel 471. Malware abuses trusted Google API endpoints to blend beacon traffic with normal web activity, so API lookups from temp-resident binaries are a heuristic C2 indicator that benefits from process-path context to reduce noise.

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Suspicious Google API DNS Query From Temporary Directory Process Abused for C2
Pivot detection · T1102.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.