Suspicious Google API DNS Query From Temporary Directory Process Abused for C2

ATT&CK techniques

C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1102.002Bidirectional Communication
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries to Google Sheets or Drive API hosts originating from a process running out of a temporary or user AppData directory, a covert command-and-control channel described by Intel 471. Malware abuses trusted Google API endpoints to blend beacon traffic with normal web activity, so API lookups from temp-resident binaries are a heuristic C2 indicator that benefits from process-path context to reduce noise.

Reporting behind it

Related detections7 linkedT1102.002 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Google API DNS Query From Temporary Directory Process Abused for C2

Pivot detection · T1102.002 · 7 related

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